In this essay, Professor Pierce describes the history of the deference doctrines the Supreme Court has announced and applied to agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes and rules over the last seventy years. He predicts that the Court will continue to reduce the scope and strength of those doctrines, in part because of increasing concern about the temporal inconsistencies created by those doctrines. In the current highly polarized political environment, deference doctrines create a legal environment in which the "law" applicable to many agency actions changes every time a President of one party replaces a President of the other party.
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found that courts have upheld agency actions in 55% to 73% of cases. 8 The Skidmore test has also produced inconsistent and unpredictable results, however.
B. Chevron
In its 1984 opinion in Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, the Court announced a new test that most people believed to be a replacement for the Skidmore test:
When a court reviews an agency's construction of a statute which it administers, it is confronted with two questions. First, always is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter. If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.
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In other parts of the opinion, the court replaced "permissible" with "reasonable. Normally, an agency rule would be arbitrary and capricious if the agency has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.
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The Court based the Chevron test on constitutional and political grounds as well as on the basis of comparative expertise. The Court distinguished between issues of law that a Court can resolve by determining the intent of Congress and issues of policy that should be resolved by the politically accountable Executive Branch rather than the politically unaccountable Judicial Branch when Congress has declined to resolve the issue.
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The Chevron test has another beneficial effect in addition to the enhanced political accountability for policy decisions that it yields. By giving agencies the discretion to choose among several "reasonable" interpretations of an ambiguous statute, the Chevron test reduces geographic differences in the meaning given to national statutes by reducing the number of splits among the circuits that were produced by circuit court applications of the less deferential Skidmore test. 14 At least for a time, Chevron had that effect as it was applied by circuit courts. A study of applications of Chevron by circuit courts the year after the court decided Chevron found that the rate at which courts upheld agency interpretations of statutes was 81%--a rate between 10% and 30% greater than the 12 463 U.S. 29,43 (1983 A year after the Court issued its opinion in Mead, a majority seemed to merge and to blend the Chevron and Skidmore doctrines in Barnhart v. Walton. 42 The majority concluded that an agency's "longstanding" statutory interpretation was entitled to
Chevron deference even though it was not announced in a rulemaking or in a formal adjudication because of "the interstitial nature of the legal question, the related expertise of the Agency, the importance of the question to administration of the statute, the complexity of that administration, and the careful consideration the Agency has given the question over a long period of time . . ."
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In a concurring opinion, Justice Scalia agreed that the interpretation at issue was due Chevron deference, but he criticized the majority's reference to "anachronis[tic]"
factors like whether the agency interpretation is "longstanding," as "a relic of the preChevron days when there was thought to be only one 'correct' interpretation of a statutory text." 44 He noted that the interpretation the Court upheld in the Chevron case itself was a recent change from a prior interpretation. 45 In the meantime, the circuit courts were doing their best to comply with the Supreme Court's constantly changing approach to deference. They began by applying
Chevron consistently, with a resulting large increase in the proportion of agency statutory interpretations they upheld. 46 As they began to observe the inconsistency in the Supreme Court's approach to Chevron, however, they followed the Court's lead and became less 42 it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation." 64 As applied, the doctrine never had as powerful an effect as the initial characterization of the test by the Court implied. 65 In recent years, the Court has qualified the doctrine in many ways. 66 Many of the qualifications were based on an article in which John Manning made a strong argument that Auer deference was not sensible even if Chevron deference was. 67 Manning argued that Auer deference gave agencies an unhealthy incentive to issue rules that are vague and ambiguous.
As modified over the last decade, the Auer doctrine does not apply when an agency adopts a new interpretation of an ambiguous rule in the process of imposing a penalty in an enforcement proceeding. 68 It does not apply when an agency relies on a new interpretation of an ambiguous rule as the basis to require a regulated firm to make large payments to third parties. 69 It does not apply when an agency has not interpreted the rule to apply in a situation for a long period of time. 70 It does not apply when the interpretation "lacks the hallmarks of thorough consideration." 71 It does not apply if it is arbitrary and capricious. 72 It does not apply when the rule the agency is interpreting is as broad as the statute the agency is implementing. 73 Justice Scalia also dissented from the decision in Brand X that explicitly authorized agencies to change statutory interpretations that a court has upheld as reasonable even though Brand X seems to be just a restatement of Chevron. 83 In fact,
Chevron itself involved the same sequence of agency and judicial interpretations that the Court held to be permissible in Brand X.
In one opinion he wrote for a majority of Justices during the 2015 Term, Justice
Scalia ignored the first step of the Chevron test and then applied an extraordinarily strong version of step two that has the effect of precluding the agency from adopting an interpretation of the statute that differs from the Court's interpretation. 84 In dicta in another opinion he wrote during the 2015 Term, Justice Scalia engaged in a harsh critique of all deference doctrines:
The [APA] was framed against a background of rapid expansion of the administrative process as a check upon administrators whose zeal might otherwise have carried them to excesses not contemplated in legislation creating their offices.
* * *
The Act thus contemplates that courts, not agencies, will authoritatively resolve ambiguities in statutes and regulations. None of the other Justices has expressed an opinion for or against Chevron, but all have joined in opinions that ignore Chevron, opinions that conclude that it does not apply for some reason, and qualified it in important respects.
D. Inferring the Motives of the Justices
The opinions described in sections B and C provide persuasive evidence that the Court is in the process of making major changes in its deference doctrines. Those opinions are likely to foreshadow opinions that overrule the doctrines, apply them less frequently, and/or weaken them further.
This section will attempt the risky task of inferring the motives of the Justices.
The starting point in any such effort must be to recognize that it is unlikely that any Justice has only one reason for doubting the wisdom of the original strong versions of the deference doctrines. Thus, for instance, Justice Thomas undoubtedly is motivated in part by his belief that the Chevron doctrine is unconstitutional; Justice Breyer is motivated in part by his belief that the Chevron test is too simplistic; and the Justices who have urged the Court to overrule the Auer doctrine are motivated in part by their concern that it encourages agencies to issue rules that are vague and ambiguous.
The Court's recent pattern of opinions provides circumstantial evidence of one source of concern about the effects of the deference doctrines that seems to be shared by 85 135 S.Ct. at 1211. 86 See, e.g. cases cited in notes 31-55, supra.
all of the Justices--temporal differences in interpretations of statutes and rules based on changes in the political party that controls the Executive Branch. This concern would explain Justice Scalia's dissent in Brand X and many of the Court's other recent opinions.
The interpretive issue in King was whether the ACA makes the citizens of all fifty states eligible for large tax credits when they buy health insurance or whether only the citizens of twelve states would be eligible for the credits. The statutory provision seemed to support the latter position, and three dissenting Justices expressed that view. The majority used the structure and purpose of the statute to support its conclusion that the statute was ambiguous. Ordinarily, the majority would then have applied Chevron and upheld the agency interpretation as reasonable. The majority declined to apply Chevron, however, based in part on the importance of the issue.
King is an excellent example of a context in which it makes sense for the Court to eliminates the potential for an agency to adopt a different interpretation in the future. All nine Justices concluded that any interpretation of an ambiguous provision of a regulatory statute that would allow an agency t make a major decision without considering its costs would be unreasonable. This unusual application of step two of Chevron also eliminated the potential for differing interpretations over time as a result of changes in the regulatory philosophy of each President. The resulting consistency and predictability helps both regulated firms and the agencies that regulate them. There are many other contexts in which the importance of the interpretive issue justifies a decision not to defer to an agency's "reasonable" interpretation of an ambiguous statute or a rule, thereby creating a situation in which no one who is affected by the interpretation can act in reliance on the interpretation adopted by an agency at any particular time.
There are also many other situations in which the interpretive issue is not Mack Sales and Service v. NLRB. 90 The Court described in detail (and with obvious disapproval) the many ways in which the NLRB had changed its interpretations and applications of the NLRB to produce results that favored either employees or employers.
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Like the vast majority of the many interpretations of ambiguous statutes and rules that change from one Administration to another, the interpretations at issue in Mortgage Bankers and Allentown Mack are not "important" to anyone except politicians and some of the constituencies to which they are beholden. Yet, it seems wrong in some important sense to acquiesce in a legal regime that allows myriad changes in the meaning of legal terms every time a President of one party replaces a President of the other party.
Circumstantial evidence supports the inference that all of the Justices dislike this temporal inconsistency effect of deference doctrines. They appear to share a wellfounded belief that the law should not change significantly every time there is a change in the party that controls the Executive Branch.
III. Costs and Benefits of a Change in Deference Doctrines
The costs and benefits of a major change in deference doctrines depend on the nature of the change. One option would be to eliminate all deference doctrines. That change would reduce temporal inconsistency but at a very high cost in terms of increased geographic inconsistency and failure to recognize the comparative institutional advantages of agencies in the forms of superior knowledge of the field and superior understanding of the ways in which an interpretation of a statute affects the ability of the agency to implement a coherent and efficient regulatory regime. 
